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ABSTRACT
After three years of near stagnation, the mood in Europe is definitely gloomy. Many doubt that the
European model has a future. In this paper, I argue that things are not so bad, and there is room for
optimism.  Over the last thirty years, productivity growth has been much higher in Europe than in
the United States. Productivity levels are roughly similar in the European Union and in the United
States today. The main difference is that Europe has used some of the increase in productivity to
increase leisure rather than income, while the U.S. has done the opposite.  Turning to the present,
a deep and wide ranging reform process is taking place. This reform process is driven by reforms
in financial and product markets. Reforms in those markets are in turn putting pressure for reform
in the labor market. Reform in the labor market will eventually take place, but not overnight and not
without political tensions. These tensions have dominated and will continue to dominate the news;
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After three years of near stagnation, the mood in Europe is de¯nitely gloomy.
The two economics books on the bestseller's list in France in 2003 are called \La
France qui Tombe" (the Fall of France) (Baverez [2003]), and \Le Desarroi Fran-
cais" (the French Disarray) (Duhamel [2003]). Both books o®er a pessimistic vision
of France and its economic future, a future in which, unless dramatic reforms are
implemented, France will steadily lose ground against its competitors.
Governments are trying to put on a good face, but their boasts, such as the goal
adopted at the EU Lisbon conference in March 2000 to make the European Union
\the world's most dynamic and competitive economy within ten years" are seen
as largely empty and pathetic.
The most articulate diagnoses argue that, like Stalinist growth in another time
and place, the European model worked well for post-war Europe, but is no longer
¯t for the times.
For much of the post-war period, the argument goes, European growth was \catching{
up growth," based primarily on imitation rather than innovation. For such growth,
large ¯rms, protected in both goods and ¯nancial markets, could do a good job.
They could do much of the R&D in-house. They could develop long-term relations
with suppliers of funds. They could o®er long-term relations and job security to
their workers. The rents generated in the goods markets could be shared between
¯rms, workers, and the state, and to help ¯nance the welfare state.
Now that European growth must increasingly be based on innovation, now that
¯rms cannot be insulated from foreign competition, the European model has be-
come dysfunctional. Relations between ¯rms and suppliers of funds, between ¯rms
and their workers, must all be rede¯ned. This requires nothing short of a complete
transformation of economic and social relations.1 So far, the argument concludes,
Europe has not risen to the challenge. Instead, it seems increasingly petri¯ed,
1. Many of these themes are developed in a recent report to the European Commission, known
as the \Sapir Report" [2004].Future of Europe 3
unable to engage in fundamental reforms. This is why the future is bleak.2
I have a more optimistic assessment. In this paper, I want to argue that:
² Things are not so bad. Over the last thirty years, productivity growth has
been much higher in Europe than in the United States. Productivity levels
are roughly similar today in the EU and in the U.S. The main di®erence
is that Europe has used some of the increase in productivity to increase
leisure rather than income, while the U.S. has done the opposite.
² A deep and wide{ranging reform process is taking place in Europe. This
process is driven by reforms in ¯nancial and product markets. Reforms in
those markets are in turn putting pressure for reform in the labor market.
Reform in the labor market will eventually take place, but not overnight
and not without political tensions. These tensions have dominated and will
continue to dominate the news; but they are a symptom of change, not a
re°ection of immobility.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 looks at the facts, focusing on pro-
ductivity, income, and employment. Section 2 focuses on ¯nancial and product
market reforms. Section 3 discusses implications for labor market reforms. Section
4 concludes.
1 Some Facts
Two facts are often cited by Euro-pessimists: GDP per person in the European
Union, measured at purchasing power parity (PPP) prices, stands at 70% of GDP
per person in the United States. Not only that, but this ratio is the same as it was
30 years ago.3
These facts are correct. They suggest a Europe stuck at a substantially lower stan-
dard of living than the United States, and unable to catch up. This interpretation
2. For example, a description of Germany along these lines is given by Siebert [2003].
3. As of the time of this writing, the actual exchange rate of 1.20 dollars to the Euro is close to
the PPP exchange rate.Future of Europe 4
would be misleading however, and the reason why is shown in the numbers in Ta-
ble 1. Table 1 gives GDP per capita, GDP per hour, and hours per capita for the
EU-15 in general, and for France in particular, as ratios to the United States, for
both 1970 and 2000. The reason for choosing France as an example of a European
country, here and often below (showing the numbers for all 15 countries would lead
to unwieldy tables) is twofold. The ¯rst is that it is a large European country, and
one often perceived as a poster child for the European malaise.4 The second reason
is, quite simply, that I know France better than the other European countries...
Table 1. PPP GDP per person, PPP GDP per hour, and Hours per
person, 1970 and 2000: U.S., EU-15, and France. (U.S.=100)
GDP per person GDP per hour Hours per person
1970 2000 1970 2000 1970 2000
US 100 100 100 100 100 100
EU-15 69 70 65 91 101 77
France 73 71 73 105 99 67
Source: EU Ameco data base.
² The ¯rst two columns, which show the evolution of GDP per capita rela-
tive to the United States, con¯rm the two facts presented earlier: The gap
between the EU-15 and the U.S. has remained roughly constant; the gap
between France and the U.S. has even increased a little.
4. For the same reasons, Germany would also be a natural candidate. But the German reuni¯-
cation of the early 1990s leads to both German-speci¯c issues, and to issues of measurement when
looking at periods which include reuni¯cation.Future of Europe 5
² The next two columns show however that labor productivity, measured as
GDP per hour worked, has increased much faster in Europe than in the
United States. Relative EU productivity, which stood at 65% of the U.S.
in 1970 now stands at roughly 90%. French labor productivity now exceeds
U.S. labor productivity.
² The last two columns, which give hours worked per person (total hours
worked divided by total population) give the key to the divergent evolutions
shown in the earlier columns. As relative EU labor productivity increased,
relative hours worked decreased in roughly the same proportion, leading to
a roughly constant relative GDP per capita.
In other words, had relative hours worked remained the same, the EU would have
today roughly the same income per capita as the U.S. The stability of the U.S{EU
gap in relative income per capita comes from the decline in hours worked.
There is another way of stating the same underlying facts, looking at absolute
rather than relative evolutions, which is quite striking. In the United States, over
the period 1970 to 2000, GDP per hour increased by 38%. Hours per person also
increased, by 26%, so GDP per person increased by 64%. In France, over the same
period, GDP per hour increased by 83%. But hours per person decreased by 23%,
so GDP per capita only increased by 60%. In that light, the performance of France
(and of the European Union in general) does not look so bad: A much higher rate
of growth of productivity than the U.S., and, as one might expect given that leisure
is a normal good, the allocation of part of that increase to increased income, and
part to increased leisure.
Is this too polemical a way of stating the facts? Is labor productivity correctly
measured? Can the decrease in hours worked really be interpreted as an increase
in leisure? What about the recent past, where the U.S. appears to have accelerated
relative to Europe? These questions require a closer look at the facts.Future of Europe 6
1.1 Productivity
There are at least two obvious issues of interpretation with the productivity num-
bers presented above.
In many European countries, the unemployment rate is high, higher than in the
United States, and high unemployment disproportionately a®ects low skill workers.
In a number of European countries also, the ratio of the minimum wage to the
average wage is higher than it is in the United States, leading again to the potential
exclusion of low skill workers from employment.
By excluding more low productivity workers from employment, both factors tend
to increase measured labor productivity. In comparing labor productivity across
countries, we may want to control for this e®ect. One way to do so, if we want to
compare the U.S. and France for example, is to assume that wages re°ect produc-
tivities, to use the information from the U.S. wage distribution to ¯ll the French
wage distribution between the relative French minimum wage and the (lower) U.S.
relative minimum wage, and then to compute the resulting productivity adjust-
ment. Such a computation was made in a comparison of productivity in France,
Germany, and the United States by McKinsey ([1997], updated [2002]); this com-
putation gives a downward adjustment for French labor productivity of about 6%,
so yielding roughly similar labor productivity in both countries.
The second issue is that labor productivity re°ects not only the state of technology,
but also the capital-labor ratio chosen by ¯rms. Increases in the cost of labor
lead ¯rms to decrease labor relative to capital, leading to an increase in labor
productivity. To control for this, the obvious solution, at least conceptually, is
to shift from comparisons of labor productivity to comparisons of total factor
productivity. The capital{output ratio appears indeed to be typically higher in
Europe than in the U.S. Based on OECD series for the business sector, the ratio
is, for example, 30% higher in France than it is in the U.S. A back of the enveloppe
computation suggests that, starting from roughly equal labor productivities (which
is where we started after the correction above), the level of French TFP is roughlyFuture of Europe 7
10% lower than that of the U.S.5
In summary, the two adjustments lead to a more modest assessment of European
productivity relative to U.S. productivity. But the EU in general, and France in
particular, remain within close range of U.S. levels.
1.2 Hours Worked
Should we interpret the large decrease in hours worked per person in Europe as the
result of preferences leading to the choice of leisure over income as productivity
increased? Or should we interpret it instead as the result of increasing distortions,
such as higher taxes on work, an increase in the minimum wage, generous or forced
early retirement programs, and so on?6
Let's start with a closer look at the facts. Given that di®erent margins (how many
hours to work, whether to be employed or unemployed, whether to participate or
not) imply di®erent choices, it is useful to start by decomposing the change in
hours worked as follows:
¢ln(HN=P) = ¢lnH + ¢ln(N=L) + ¢ln(L=P)
= ¢lnH + ¢ln(1 ¡ u) + ¢ln(L=P)
The change in hours worked per person, HN=P, is equal to the change in hours
worked per worker, H, plus the change in the ratio of employment, N, to the labor
5. The computation is as follows. Start with the standard expression for the Solow residual:
¢lnA = ¢lnY ¡ ®¢lnN ¡ (1 ¡ ®)¢lnK, where ¢ here refers to the di®erence across the two
countries, rather the change in time. Rewrite it as: ¢lnA = ®(¢lnY ¡¢lnN)+(1¡®)(¢lnY ¡
¢lnK). If labor productivity is the same in both countries, and the share of capital 1¡® is equal
to 0.33, then a 30% di®erence in the capital output ratio leads to a 10% di®erence in TFP levels.
6. Another way of asking the same basic question is the following: In trying to compare welfare
rather than just income per capita, what shadow price should we use to weigh leisure? Should we
use the wage, in which case the measure of welfare is roughly similar in Europe than in the U.S,
or should we use a much lower shadow price, in which case Europe remains substantially behind.Future of Europe 8
force, L (equivalently, one minus the unemployment rate), plus the change in the
ratio of the labor force L to population, P (equivalently the participation rate).
Applying this decomposition to the various European countries yields two main
conclusions:
² Most of the decrease in hours worked per person has come, in an accounting
sense, from the decrease in hours worked per worker, rather than from
increases in unemployment or decreases in participation rates.
Applying for example this formula to France for the period 1970 to 2000
gives -23%, -7%, and 7% for the three terms on the right. Hours per worker
decreased by 23%, from 1962 hours per year in 1970 to 1550 hours per year
in 2000. The unemployment rate increased by 7 percentage points, from 2%
in 1970 to 9% in 2000. And the participation rate increased by 7%, going
from 0.42 in 1970 to 0.45 in 2000. In this decomposition, France appears
representative of other European countries.
² Focusing on the decrease in hours worked per worker, most of the decrease
has come from a decrease in hours worked per full time worker, rather
than from an increase in the proportion of part time workers.7 In France,
for example, full time wage earners worked an average of 45.9 hours in
1970; they worked only 39.5 hours in 1999|a 15.0% decrease. Since 1999,
the decrease has been more pronounced, due to the two \35-hour" laws
passed in 1998 (mandating a reduction of the workweek to 35 hours by 2000
for ¯rms with more than 20 employees) and in 2000 (mandating a similar
reduction by 2002 for public sector employees, and for ¯rms with less than
20 employees).8 The latest available number puts the average workweek at
7. The motivation for this further decomposition is that some of the increase in part{time
employment may not have been voluntary. 20% of part time workers in Europe in 2000 said it
was because they could not ¯nd full-time jobs. The corresponding number for the U.S. is 8%.
8. Whether the shift to 35 hours should be seen as voluntary is a matter of debate. The promise
to pass such a law was probably the main factor behind the victory of the Socialist government
in 1997. Whether or not voters actually understood the income/leisure trade{o® is now hotly
debated.Future of Europe 9
38.3 hours in 2001, a 18% decline since 1970.9
The facts therefore suggest that much of the decline in hours worked has come
from a decline in hours worked per full time worker. It is reasonable to think
that, over thirty years, one should interpret this choice as voluntary on the part
of workers. But this does not yet settle the issue. This choice may be the result
of the interaction of preferences and an the increase in productivity, or the result
of increasing tax distortions faced by workers. And, indeed, the evidence suggests
that marginal tax rates (constructed by adding marginal income and payroll tax
rates, and consumption tax rates) have increased more in Europe than in the U.S.
(10-15% for most EU countries, relative to about 8% for the U.S.)10
The answer as to how much of the decrease in hours can be attributed to preferences
or changes in tax rates depends on what assumptions one is willing to make about
preferences, and the implied strength of income and substitution e®ects. In a recent
study, Prescott [2003], using a utility function logarithmic in consumption and
leisure, has argued that all of the decrease in hours in Europe could be attributed
to the increase in taxes. One can object however to his assumptions about utility,
and the large implied elasticity of labor supply. More importantly, within Europe,
the cross{country relation between the decrease in hours and the increase in tax
rates is weak. A revealing example here is that of Ireland. Average hours worked
per worker in Ireland have decreased from 2140 in 1970 to 1670 in 2000, a 25%
decrease over the period, and hours worked by full time workers have decreased
in line with the European average.11 This decline can clearly not be blamed on a
depressed labor market: Ireland has boomed during the period, has seen major in-
migration, an increase in participation rates, and unemployment is now very low.
Nor can it be blamed on an increase in tax rates. The increase in the average tax
rate has been small, about 3% compared to the 8% increase in the U.S. Turning
9. Lest one conclude that France is an outlier, it is useful to note that the country with the
lowest number of hours worked per year per worker is Germany, with 1450 hours compared to
France's 1550.
10. For detailed evidence on marginal tax rates, and their recent evolution, see Joumard [2001].
11. This statement is based on the evolution of hours worked by full time workers in manufac-
turing, the only series available for the period at hand.Future of Europe 10
to more formal evidence, econometric estimates based on panel data evidence (see
Nickell [2003] for a recent survey and discussion) typically ¯nd a signi¯cant, but
more modest role for taxes in explaining the decline in hours per capita. They
imply that the evolution of tax rates may explain about a third of the decrease in
hours per capita in Europe over the period.
To summarize: Most of the decrease in hours per capita over the last 30 years in
Europe re°ects a decrease in hours worked per full{time worker, a choice which
is likely to be made voluntarily by workers. The remaining issue is how much of
this choice comes from preferences and increasing income, and how much from
increasing tax distortions. I read the evidence as suggesting an e®ect of taxes, but
with a large role left for preferences.12
1.3 Evolutions Since the Mid-1990s
Looking at productivity growth since 1970, or at productivity levels today, may
not tell the whole story. Indeed, part of the Euro{pessimism is based on evolutions
since the mid 1990s, and the feeling that the U.S. is again gaining advantage on
Europe.
The basic numbers are given in Table 2, based on the work of Van Ark et al [2002a].
The table gives TFP growth numbers for the U.S., the EU, and France, for the
1980s, for the 1990s, and for each half decade of the 1990s.
The table yields three main conclusions. In the 1980s, European TFP growth was
higher than in the U.S. In the 1990s, it was roughly the same as in the US. And
this was the result of a ¯rst half decade with Europe growing faster than the U.S.,
but a second half decade with the U.S. growing faster than Europe.
12. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that Europeans enjoy their leisure more than their U.S.
counterparts. I have looked for more formal evidence from surveys on happiness and leisure across
countries, but have not been able to ¯nd it.Future of Europe 11
Table 2. Total factor productivity growth: U.S., EU, and France, 1980-
2000. (Percent per year)
1980s 1990s 1990-1995 1995-2000
U.S. 0.91 1.06 0.74 1.39
EU-15 1.45 1.04 1.36 0.72
France 1.90 0.68 0.89 0.38
Van Ark [2002a], Tables 19 and A7.
Reaching conclusions about trend changes in TFP based on just ¯ve years of data is
a dangerous exercise.13 Cyclical factors and measurement issues may well dominate
any trend change over a short period. But we also know that the ¯rst three years
of this decade have looked very much like the second half of the previous decade,
with very high TFP growth in the U.S. despite a recession, and continuing low
TFP growth in Europe. For this reason, most observers now believe that we have
indeed seen a change in relative trends, starting around 1995.
The nature and the origins of the change have been the subject of a large amount
of recent work. Some have emphasized the role of information technologies (IT),
both in the IT-producing and the IT-using sector. Some have emphasized di®er-
ences between evolutions in manufacturing and services. For these reasons, Table 3
presents labor productivity growth rates for each half decade of the 1990s, for the
U.S. and the EU (I leave France out, so as not to clutter the table), distinguishing
between IT-producing, IT-using, and non-IT-using sectors and between manufac-
turing and services. The table is based on the work of Van Ark et al [2002b],
13. The standard deviation of annual productivity growth in the U.S. or Europe is roughly 1%.
Assuming no correlation between the two growth rates, this implies that the di®erence between
¯ve-year average growth rates in Europe and in the U.S. has a standard deviation of (
p
2=5) =
0.63.Future of Europe 12
which pays careful attention to problems of comparability across countries, using
in particular harmonized price de°ators for IT (the construction of national price
de°ators for IT varies widely across countries, and makes direct comparisons of
national ¯gures unreliable).
Table 3. Labor productivity growth, IT producing/IT using, Manufac-
turing/services: U.S. and EU, 1990s. (Percent per year)
US EU
Share 1990-95 1995-2000 1990-95 1995-2000
Overall 1.1 2.5 1.9 1.4
IT producing
Manufacturing 2.6 15.1 23.7 11.1 13.8
Services 4.7 3.1 1.8 4.4 6.5
IT using
Manufacturing 4.3 -0.3 1.2 3.1 2.1
Services 26.0 1.9 5.4 1.1 1.4
Non IT using
Manufacturing 9.3 3.0 1.4 3.8 1.5
Services 43.0 -0.4 0.4 0.6 0.2
\Share" in the ¯rst column is the share of the sector in US GDP, in percent. Source:
Van Ark [2002b], Tables 5 and 6.
The table yields the following three main conclusions:
² Some have argued that the slowdown in productivity growth in Europe since
1995 re°ects primarily a slowdown in productivity growth in manufacturing
([Daveri 2003]). The table shows that manufacturing productivity growth
outside the IT producing sector has indeed declined (this decline is present
in all EU countries, except for the Netherlands.) But it has declined to a
rate which is still higher than that of the U.S. This appears more to beFuture of Europe 13
evidence of the end of catch{up growth than of any emerging European
inability to innovate in manufacturing.
² Some have argued that Europe has missed the IT revolution, in the sense
that IT production, and its associated high productivity growth, has been
more limited in Europe. The table cannot by itself answer the question, as
what is needed in addition to the information in the table is the share of
the IT producing sector in GDP in the U.S. and in European countries.
This share has been indeed slightly smaller in the EU than in the US, 6.0%
versus 7.3%. But this average hides di®erences across countries. A number
of countries, in particular Ireland and Finland have shares which exceed
10%.
² Finally, some have argued that the main problem of Europe has been in the
use rather than the production of IT. The evidence is somewhat mixed:
One way to proceed is to look at the contribution of IT capital to growth in
the IT-using sector. This exercise was carried out by Colecchia and Schreyer
[2002] for example, using a growth accounting framework. Their conclusion
is that investment in IT was substantially higher in the U.S. than in Europe
in the second part of the 1990s, and so led to more labor productivity growth
in the IT-using sector in the U.S. than in Europe. However, such a conclusion
is only correct if the assumptions underlying growth accounting are correct,
if, in particular, the investment in IT in the U.S. had an expected rate of
return equal to the user cost of that capital. Many observers doubt that
this was the case, and the evidence on IT investment since 2000 suggests
that there was indeed substantial overinvestment in IT in the second half
of the 1990s.
Another way to proceed is to look directly at changes in labor productiv-
ity growth, without trying to separate between the contribution of capital
accumulation and the contribution of TFP growth. This is what is done in
Table 3. The numbers suggest that there was indeed a large di®erence in
labor productivity growth in the IT-using service sector, 5.4% in the U.S.Future of Europe 14
versus 1.4% for the EU. This di®erence is important because the sector ac-
counts for a substantial proportion of GDP, 26% in the U.S., 21% in the
EU.
Can one trace this di®erence to speci¯c sectors, so as to get a sense of
what the U.S. did right, or Europe did wrong? A more detailed exploration
by Van Ark et al concludes that the di®erence is nearly fully attributable
to three sectors: retail trade, wholesale trade, and securities. Productivity
growth in this third sector seems largely attributable to the increase in
internet-based and other transactions associated with the bubble economy
of the late 1990s. This leads to a focus on retail and wholesale trade as two
of the main factors behind the di®erence between the U.S. and the EU in
the late 1990s, a conclusion shared by a number of other studies (McKinsey
[2001] for the U.S., McKinsey [2002] for a comparison of France, Germany,
and the U.S.)
What should one conclude for the broad examination of the facts? Contrary to
widespread perceptions, Europe has done very well over the last 30 years. Indeed,
some European countries, such as France, have a level of productivity roughly equal
to that of the United States. The income level has not caught up with that of the
United States, but only because of a di®erent choice between income and leisure.
In the recent past, the U.S. has clearly done better than Europe. Clearly, Europe
is somewhat behind in IT production. It also has invested less in IT capital, but it
is not clear that this was wrong. Some sectors, trade in particular, have done very
well in the United States; such an increase in productivity growth has not been
visible in Europe; what this means for the future is hard to tell without a closer
look at the trade sector. I shall return to it in the next section.
2 Reforms In the Financial and Product Markets
The last ¯fteen years have seen dramatic changes in goods and ¯nancial markets
in Europe. Most of these changes can be traced to a reform process in whichFuture of Europe 15
\Bruxelles" (this is the way Europeans refer to the European Commission, located
in Bruxelles) has played a central role, forcing (or allowing?) national governments
to implement reforms they would probably not have implemented on their own.
2.1 The Role of Bruxelles
A central document here is the \White Paper" written in 1985 by the European
Commission, under the presidency of Jacques Delors. At the time, it was felt that
the European Union needed a new and more ambitious goal, and, in that report,
the Commission laid a plan for achieving a fully integrated European internal
market by 1992.14
The report o®ered a timetable to achieve the elimination of physical barriers,
of ¯scal barriers, and of technical barriers{the di®erent standards for individual
products in place in di®erent countries. Realizing that harmonization of rules and
regulation might be di±cult to achieve or even lead to deadlock, the report argued
for using, whenever possible, the more wide{ranging principle of \mutual recogni-
tion": \If a product is lawfully manufactured and marketed in one member state,
there is no reason why it should not be sold freely throughout the community".
It also emphasized the role of competition policy in achieving and maintaining
competition in the internal market.
At the end of 1992, most of the agenda set out in 1985 was indeed achieved, and, in
a highly symbolic step, border controls for goods were eliminated (Financial market
integration took longer, but has accelerated with the adoption of the Euro in 1999.
The current plan is to have a fully integrated ¯nancial market by 2005). The
process of reform continued however, through the implementation of competition
policy. Today, competition policy and ¯ghts between the current Commissioner,
Mario Monti, and national governments, often make the news.
European competition policy comes into play only when trade between member
14. Surely by EU standards, but indeed by any standard, this is a remarkably clear document
(Commission of the European Communities [1985]).Future of Europe 16
states is a®ected. In practice, given the integration of markets, this still leaves a
very broad scope for Bruxelles to intervene. European competition policy covers
four areas, in which the Commission either can act alone, or shares its powers with
national own competition authorities and law courts: 15
² The elimination of anti{competition agreements or abuse of dominant po-
sition. It can prohibit an agreement, and even impose ¯nes, up to 10% of
the world turnover of the relevant parties. Examples of recent interven-
tions range from a ruling against British Airways in its relations with travel
agents, to a ruling against the use by the Belgian Architect Association of
a minimum fee scale.
² The liberalization of monopolistic sectors. The Commission can initiate the
opening up of markets. It is a 1996 Commission directive which led for
example to the opening up of the market for mobile telecommunication
services to competition. It also checks that member states, when granting
exclusive rights, comply with the European Union competition rules. In
1997 for example, the Commission ruled that the Spanish state had given
an unfair advantage to the state company in the mobile phone market,
forcing the company to pay back the state for the amount of the implicit
subsidy the state had given the company.
² The control of mergers between ¯rms (for ¯rms with a turnover in excess
of 250 million euros). Such mergers require prior noti¯cation to the Com-
mission, and the Commission has exclusive power to approve or prohibit a
given merger. In November 2003 for example, the Commission rejected a
merger which would have led the French ¯rm Lagardµ ere to dominate the
book distribution network in France; the terms of the merger had to be mod-
i¯ed so as to maintain competition in book distribution and thus satisfy the
Commission.
² The monitoring of state aid. This is another area where the Commission
15. For further description, see European Commission [2000]. For a description of reforms over
time, see the annual reports from the European Commission (for example European Commission
[2002].)Future of Europe 17
has exclusive power, and an area where it often clashes with governments.
In 2003 for example, the Commission rejected a plan by the French gov-
ernment to rescue the French ¯rm Alstom, provoking widespread criticism
of Bruxelles in France. Not until the plan was modi¯ed was it approved
by Bruxelles. Some politically hot sectors, such as agriculture, or coal, or
¯sheries, are excluded. But, in general, the rules governing restructuring or
rescue plans are tough: They can only take the form of short{term loans,
at the normal commercial rate, and can only be granted once.
These are considerable powers, and the Commission has not hesitated to use
them.16 This raises two intriguing questions. The ¯rst is why this part of the
Commission has been so willing to reform and deregulate, when other parts of the
Commission showed much less commitment to markets.17 The second is why gov-
ernments have been willing to leave such power in the hands of the Commission.
One hypothesis is that this happened partly by accident, that Bruxelles was able
to use its mandate as de¯ned in the Treaty in a way that national governments had
not anticipated. But this hypothesis is belied by the fact that governments have, at
various times, increased the powers of the Commission in matters of competition
policy. For example, rules on state aid to airline companies were tightened in 1994,
general rules on rescue plans were tightened in 1999. This suggests an alternative
hypothesis, that governments have willingly delegated those powers to Bruxelles,
in order to achieve reforms, while being able to shift the blame to Bruxelles. This
point is important. As I shall argue later, product and market deregulation put
strong pressures on labor market institutions, raising the risk of reversal. The fact
that Bruxelles, rather than national governments, is leading the process decreases
this risk.
Does this mean that all the reforms of product and ¯nancial markets have come
from Bruxelles? Obviously not, and an important exception is privatization. But,
16. The Commission publishes an annual \state aid scoreboard", in order to report progress,
show problems, and put pressure on national governments.
17. This is one of the issues taken up in the parallel article by Alesina and Perotti [2004] in this
issue of the Journal.Future of Europe 18
there, progress has often been slower, more subject to political ebbs and °ows, and
therefore more country speci¯c. The example of France is again revealing here.
Under a socialist government, and bucking a general world trend, France was the
last rich country to nationalize a number of banks and ¯rms in the early 1980s.
The trend then changed in the late 1980s, with a ¯rst wave of privatization under a
Gaullist government in 1986-1988, and then more steady privatization since 1993,
under governments both of the right and of the left. Despite this new commitment,
the share of nationalized ¯rms in the business sector remains higher in France than
in other European countries.
2.2 Measuring the Changes in Regulation
How far has deregulation (or, more accurately, better regulation) progressed in Eu-
rope? Are there important di®erences across sectors, across countries? To answer
these questions requires constructing quantitative measures and indexes, and until
recently, such indexes were missing. Two OECD projects have now partially ¯lled
the gap. The ¯rst and more ambitious one is aimed at giving a precise characteriza-
tion of regulation circa 1998; it is based on the answers from national governments
to a questionaire assessing the status of 1300 regulatory provisions. (The data set
and the construction of the indexes are described in Nicoletti et al [1999].) The
second one is more limited in scope but has both a time series and a cross coun-
try dimension; it gives the evolution of regulation in seven sectors from 1975 to
1998 (The data set is described in Nicoletti and Scarpetta [2003].) Based on this
second data set, Table 4 gives a sense of the evolutions over time, for the U.S. and
three European countries, of two synthetic indexes, the ¯rst called \barriers to
entrepreneurship" (BE), the second \public ownership" (PO). Each index ranges
from 0 (no barriers or no public ownership) to 6.Future of Europe 19
Table 4. Indexes of regulation: U.S, France, Germany, the Netherlands.
1975-1998.
BE PO
1975 1990 1998 1975 1990 1998
U.S. 5.5 2.4 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5
France 6.0 5.1 3.3 6.0 5.8 4.9
Germany 5.3 4.3 1.9 4.6 3.9 3.0
Netherlands 4.4 5.2 2.3 5.6 5.6 4.0
Table 4 yields three conclusions. First, that regulation has steadily decreased in Eu-
rope over time, especially in the 1990s, con¯rming the informal evidence presented
earlier. Second, that Europe is still more regulated than the U.S. Third, (this is
less obvious from the table which gives numbers only for France and Germany,
but is clear when looking at the whole set of countries) that there is substantial
heterogeneity across countries. Regulation is still high in the Netherlands, public
ownership still high in France, for example.
2.3 Assessing Structural Changes
So far, the argument has focused on changes in regulation, not on the economic
outcomes themselves. There is plenty of evidence, however, that these changes in
regulation have transformed goods and ¯nancial markets.
Consider ¯rst a few macro measures. Prices of speci¯c products or classes of prod-
ucts have shown steady price convergence across countries throughout the 1990s
(European Commission [2002, Annex 1].) . With the introduction of the Euro, ex-
change rate risk has disappeared, and interest rates on bonds, risk adjusted, have
fully converged. The structure of ¯nancial relations has also changed, becoming
more arms' length. For example, the proportion of bank loans in ¯rms' ¯nancial
liabilities (based on a sample of large ¯rms) has come down from 74% in 1990 to
32% in 2002 in Germany, and from 75% to 53% in Italy (Danthine et al [2000]).Future of Europe 20
The best way, however, to get a sense of the changes that have taken place is to
look at the evolution of speci¯c sectors. Here, we can rely on a number of studies,
in particular two studies conducted by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), in
1997 and 2002. In each of these two studies, MGI assessed the levels of productivity
in speci¯c sectors in the U.S., France, and Germany, and looked for the factors
behind the level and the evolution of productivity in each country. I shall take
three sectors as examples.
² Road freight was traditionally a highly protected and regulated sector in
Europe. The internal market, the elimination of restrictions on foreign carri-
ers, and other reforms have led to a nearly deregulated market. The OECD
indexes suggest that the levels of regulation in France and Germany are sim-
ilar today to those in the U.S. (Boylaud [2000].) The MGI study suggests
that labor productivity, which stood in France and Germany at roughly
60% of the U.S. level in 1992, increased to about 85% in 2000. It documents
how changes in regulation have allowed for larger truck sizes and higher
load rates, leading to higher productivity in both European countries.18
² Uniformization of standards and ownership changes have also transformed
the automotive market, especially in France. The MGI study concludes
that, in the 1990s, France made up much of its productivity gap relative to
the U.S., with productivity growing at 7.8% in France from 1992 to 2000,
compared to 2.2% in the U.S. and Germany. It ¯nds that, in turn, this high
productivity growth can be explained by partial privatization of Renault
and the associated change in governance, and by the lifting of quotas of
Japanese imports to France|a lifting which led ¯rst to ¯nancial losses and
a crisis at Renault, and then to a successful reorganization.
² In the light of the results of the previous section that much of the di®er-
ence in productivity growth between the U.S. and Europe can be traced to
the trade sector, retail trade is particularly interesting (another reason is
18. MGI attributes half of the remaining gap to structural factors (geography, which allows for
longer hauls and faster speeds in the US), and half to more recent and more limited use of IT in
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that it accounts for a large share of total employment, 8.7% in the U.S.,
6.8% in France.) Partly because regulation largely takes the form of zon-
ing restrictions and these regulations fall outside the Bruxelles mandate,
some countries remain relatively highly regulated. In France, for example,
two laws, the \Loi Royer" and the \Loi Ra®arin" (named after its sponsor,
then the minister of commerce, now the current prime minister) give local
incumbents a large say in whether to allow for the opening of new large
stores, with predictable results.
This would seem to give us a potential key for why productivity levels and
recent productivity growth might be lower in France than in the U.S. But
the evidence turns out to be more complex:
The 2002 MGI study ¯nds that labor productivity (measured as gross mar-
gins per hour worked) in 2000 was actually higher by about 7% in the retail
food sector in France than in the US.19 Once an adjustment is made for the
truncation e®ects of the higher minimum wage in France, and for opening
hours, productivity appears roughly similar in the two countries. The con-
clusion reached by MGI is that regulation in France, which mostly takes
the form of restrictions on new entry of medium sized ¯rms, has led to a
hollowing of the size distribution of retailers, with less medium sized retail-
ers, and both more small size and more large size retailers (hypermarkets).
French small size retailers are less e±cient than their U.S. counterparts,
but French large size retailers turn out to be more e±cient. Turning to
productivity growth over the 1990s, the MGI study does not ¯nd obvious
explanations for the apparently better performance of the US. The degree
of use of IT does not appear radically di®erent; in 1999, spending on IT was
equal to 8% of gross margins in the US, versus 6.3% in France and 6.0% in
Germany.
This leads one groping for an explanation of the apparently di®erent evo-
19. The 1997 study also constructs measures of TFP. Arguing that large di®erences in land
prices make construction of comparable capital stocks unreliable, it uses square footage as a
proxy measure for capital. Results are quite similar to those for labor productivity.Future of Europe 22
lutions of productivity in retail trade in the U.S. and Europe in the 1990s.
A tentative explanation is based on the ¯ndings of Foster et al [2002], who
¯nd that, in the U.S., most of the productivity growth in retail trade in
the 1990s can be attributed to composition e®ects, i.e. the replacement of
less productive by more productive establishments. A similar study does
not exist for France, but the evidence is that regulation has indeed sharply
limited the amount of new permits, especially since the tightening of zoning
restrictions in 1996. Thus, regulation may be limiting productivity growth
by restricting turnover of ¯rms.20 (An argument against this hypothesis is
that it does not obviously extend to other European countries. In particu-
lar, productivity growth appears to have been low in retail trade in the UK
in the 1990s (Basu et al [2003]), a country with low regulation of the retail
trade sector.21)
The MGI studies cover a number of other sectors, from ¯xed and mobile telecom-
munications to electricity generation and distribution, to retail banking. In most
of these sectors, deregulation (or appropriate regulation, as in the case of telecom-
munications) appears to have had important e®ects on the behavior of ¯rms, the
degree of competition, and the level of productivity. This however brings a puzzle:
Why hasn't this transformation, so apparent on the ground, led to higher produc-
tivity growth in the 1990s? Measurement issues, in particular for price de°ators,
the representativeness of the sectors chosen by MGI, may all play a role. I want
to end this section however with another, tentative, hypothesis. Throughout the
1990s, faced with high unemployment and low employment growth, many govern-
ments endorsed the idea of \job rich growth". The idea, a direct descendant of
the lump{of{labor fallacy, was based on the idea that output growth was given,
and so low productivity growth would allow for more employment growth.22 More
20. Bertrand and Kramarz [2002] look at the related question of whether these restrictions have
hindered employment growth, and conclude that they have.
21. Comparisons are plagued by problems of de¯nition and measurement. For example, the es-
timates of productivity growth in retail from Basu et al are substantially lower than those from
Van Ark, presented in the previous section.
22. A \success story" here is Spain, where, despite moderate output growth, dismal productivityFuture of Europe 23
generally, ¯rms were under considerable pressure to maintain employment. Given
low demand growth, this reduced the incentives of ¯rms to implement innovations
which might lead to layo®s or plant closings. Thus, a tentative hypothesis is that
many innovations were not implemented, leading to lower productivity growth.23 A
weakness of the hypothesis is that the channels through which government pressure
was applied on ¯rms are not easy to identify.24 But, if the hypothesis is partly cor-
rect, it is good news for the future, as it suggests that, if output growth increases,
so will implementation, and in turn productivity growth.
3 Implications for Labor Markets.
Jacques Delors wanted the \Single Market" report to include a \social chapter,"
a set of rules for the labor market. He did not succeed. And to a large extent,
reforms in the product and ¯nancial markets have shaped labor market changes
and labor market reforms since then. This is the focus of this section, looking both
at past evolutions, and what may lay down the road.
3.1 Deregulation in Goods and Financial Markets, Wages, and
Unemployment
Higher goods market competition increases average real wages, and is likely to
decrease unemployment. Let me brie°y go through the argument, following Blan-
chard and Giavazzi [2003], as it lays the ground for the discussion which follows.25
growth has allowed for a substantial reduction of unemployment.
23. Informal evidence from interviews of ¯rms' managers suggest that they believe that, absent
political and social constraints, they could and would reduce employment further than they have
so far.
24. One may think of testing this hypothesis by looking across sectors and countries. One should
¯nd that, ceteris paribus, sectors that had higher demand for exogenous reasons also have had
higher productivity growth. I have not explored this.
25. Blanchard and Giavazzi study the e®ect of di®erent dimensions of product market dereg-
ulation in a model with monopolistic competition in the goods market, and di®erent forms of
collective bargaining in the labor market. An extension to include capital accumulation is givenFuture of Europe 24
Consider ¯rst the case where the wage is allocative, i.e. the case where ¯rms take
the wage as given in setting prices. Then, an increase in competition will lead
¯rms to choose a lower markup, leading to a decrease in prices given wages. Put
another way, higher competition will lead to a higher real wage at any given level
of employment. Given any positively sloping labor supply or \wage curve", this
will lead, in turn, to an increase in the real wage and an increase in employment.
Consider instead the case where the wage is distributive, a case known as \e±cient
bargaining" in the labor literature. In this case, ¯rms choose prices not based on
the wage but on the reservation wage of workers. The wage itself is then chosen so
as to divide the total rents, according to the relative bargaining power of the ¯rm
and its workers.26
Think now of an increase in competition, which eliminates monopoly power, and
thus eliminates all monopoly rents (the argument holds for a partial reduction of
monopoly power, but is easier to state this way). There are then two e®ects at
work: As workers, workers lose. But, as consumers, they gain, and they gain more,
so they end up better o®. More explicitly:
² Consider a given ¯rm. The increase in competition leads to lower prices,
eliminating monopoly rents. As part of these rents were accruing to the
workers, this e®ect makes the workers in this ¯rm worse o®.
² To the extent, however, that the increase in competition a®ects all ¯rms in
the economy, this means that all prices are now lower, and the rents which
were previously going to ¯rms and workers now go to consumers (in the
form of lower prices). Thus, as consumers, workers gain. And because they
by Spector [2004]. An interesting alternative treatment, which assumes Cournot competition in
the goods market, and ¯rm{level collective bargaining in a search labor market is developed by
Ebell and Haefke [2003].
26. The question of how much of the rents workers appropriate is an old question in labor eco-
nomics. A study of the relation between wage di®erentials and the indexes of regulation described
earlier, across European countries and sectors by Nicoletti and Jean [2002] ¯nds a signi¯cant
e®ect on wages in manufacturing, a less signi¯cant e®ect outside of manufacturing. The authors
hypothesize that some of the rents are taken in forms other than wages, such as lower e®ort and
productivity or restrictions on employment.Future of Europe 25
now get all the rents, whereas before, as workers, they were only getting a
fraction of them, their real wage is higher, and they are better o®.
These conclusions raise an obvious issue: If product market deregulation, and by
implication, higher competition, increases real wages and decreases unemployment,
why do workers so often oppose it? The argument above actually gives us a key:
If the degree of monopoly power is the same to start with, and is uniformly reduced,
then all workers are indeed better o®. But, even in this case, the cost to the worker
(the lost portion of rents) is a direct e®ect, while the bene¯t (the decrease in prices)
is a general equilibrium e®ect, which may be much less salient.27
The degree of monopoly power however is not the same across sectors, nor is
deregulation uniform across the board. In this case, it is still true that the average
real wage increases, but some workers lose, while others gain. And, as in the case
of trade liberalization, those who lose know they are losing, while gains are more
di®use. The implication is straightforward. As rents are reduced in some ¯rms, and
not in others, workers in those ¯rms will lose. Thus, even if the average worker
is better o®, product market deregulation is likely to generate strikes and social
tensions. This is where the fact that much of product market deregulation is driven
by Bruxelles is of high relevance. Strikes may lead to disruptions, but are unlikely
to stop the reform process. However, for sectors where deregulation is not driven
by Bruxelles, the outcome is more in doubt. The main example here is the slow
progress of reform in the public sector.28
We have so far focused on product market deregulation. The e®ects of ¯nancial
market deregulation are slightly di®erent. One can think of ¯nancial market dereg-
ulation as increasing the elasticity of capital to the rate of return|be it to a ¯rm,
to a sector, or to a country. Deregulation may then require a decrease in the real
wage.
27. This argument is close to that developed in Gersbach [2003].
28. An insightful analysis of the problems of reform of the French public sector is given in a study
by the Institut Montaigne [2003].Future of Europe 26
Think for example of privatization. It is reasonable to think of capital in state{
owned ¯rms as being inelastic: Even if the ¯rm is making losses, the state may often
continue to invest. If the ¯rm is privatized, capital will now require the market rate
of return, and this in turn may require a decrease in the real wage. The same may
hold for a country as a whole. Limits on international capital mobility may allow
labor to extract a higher real wage, and thus a lower return to capital, without
su®ering capital °ight. Higher ¯nancial integration will then require a decrease
in the real wage. If unions do not realize the change in the environment, and do
not change their behavior, then the e®ect may be lower capital accumulation, and
lower employment for some period of time.
How much of the evolution of wages and unemployment over the recent past can
be explained by deregulation in goods and labor markets is one of my current
topics of research (see for example Blanchard and Philippon [2003]). The tentative
answer is that deregulation may well account for some of the earlier rise, and the
more recent and more limited fall in unemployment in Europe. The focus of this
section is however more on the implications for the labor market in general, and
the behavior of unions and the reform of labor institutions in particular. I now
turn to those issues.
3.2 Weaker and Smarter Unions
Deregulation implies smaller rents. Smaller rents imply smaller bene¯ts for workers
from joining a union. This in turn suggests a decrease in membership, a decrease in
the power of unions. These implications are indeed consistent with the facts. Union
membership has generally declined in Europe, going for example in France from
22% in 1980 to 10% in 1998, and from 36% in 1990 to 26% in 1998 in Germany
(Boeri et al [2001]). This decline in membership is only partly due to the decline
in rents; other factors, such as the decline in manufacturing, the increase in part
time work, have all played a role. But econometric evidence suggests that they
explain only part of the decline: A decline in rents is a plausible candidate for the
residual.Future of Europe 27
Interestingly, there has been no decline in membership in Scandinavian countries.
Union membership has increased from 78% in 1980 and to 88% in 1998 in Sweden,
from 69% to 79% in Denmark, two countries where unions have traditionally been
less confrontational than in the rest of Europe. This leads to the next point.
To caricature slightly, the rhetoric of European unions traditionally comes in one
of two forms: Some unions speak of the need for a \partnership between labor and
capital." While ¯ghting for labor, they nevertheless insist on the need to maintain
an adequate rate of return for capital, lest capital move away and employment
su®er.29 Some unions instead have a view much closer to the old \class struggle"
view of relations between capital and labor. They speak as if the ¯ght over the
distribution of income between wages and pro¯ts were a ¯ght for rents, with few
implications for employment.
In a world of high rents and low capital mobility, the second view had some justi-
¯cation. But the decline of rents and the increase in the elasticity of the demand
for labor make it a dangerous strategy today. In Blanchard and Philippon [2003],
we argue that, while it took some time, many unions have indeed shifted their
rhetoric and their attitudes|although at di®erent speeds across countries. This is
for example the case for unions in the UK, or for example for the CFDT, one of the
two main unions in France.30 Others however, such as the CGT, the other main
French union, have not changed their rhetoric very much. One interpretation is
that those unions have decided to focus on the public sector, where rent extraction
remains easier than in the private sector. (The membership of the CGT is now
primarily in the public sector). But it is reasonable to conclude that, in general,
unions have become both weaker and smarter.
29. Perhaps the best-known early statement along these lines is by Helmut Schmidt, then the
Social Democratic Chancellor of Germany, in 1976: \The pro¯ts of enterprises today are the
investments of tomorrow, and the investments of tomorrow are the jobs of the day after".
30. An ironic and revealing anecdote: In November 2003, Denis MacShane, Britain's minister for
Europe and a former senior trade union o±cial, admonished German unions for their opposition
to Chancellor Gerard SchrÄ oder's reform program, \Agenda 2010", telling them that there were
\out of touch with modernity" (Financial Times, November 19, 2003).Future of Europe 28
3.3 Reforms of Labor Market Institutions
What have been, and are likely to be, the e®ects of product and ¯nancial market
deregulation on labor market institutions, from unemployment insurance, to the
minimum wage, to employment protection? This is a hard question, and more
theoretical and empirical research needs to be done. But the following approach
seems useful. There are two broad approaches to thinking about the shape of labor
market institutions:
² The ¯rst is that these institutions are yet another way to a®ect the dis-
tribution of rents between ¯rms and workers (or between di®erent groups
of workers, or between workers and non workers).31 In this context, Figure
1, reproduced from Figure 14 in Nicoletti et al [2000], is particularly inter-
esting. It plots the degree of employment protection, as constructed by the
OECD, versus an index of product market regulation, also constructed by
the OECD based on the large regulatory data set described in the previous
section, across most OECD countries in the late 1990s. It shows the strong
positive correlation between product market regulation and employment
protection.
² The second is that these institutions are put in place to solve a number of
market imperfections, for example the failure of markets to provide adequate
unemployment insurance.
The ¯rst approach, on its own, is too cynical. The second, on its own again, is too
naive, and both sets of factors surely play a role. This gives us a way of thinking
about the e®ects of goods and ¯nancial markets deregulation.
Think ¯rst in terms of rent distribution. To the extent that rents are now smaller,
labor market institutions, thought of as distorting instruments to extract rents,
are now less attractive (this argument parallels the argument for why union mem-
bership is likely to decrease). A particularly egregious example of rent extraction
31. See Saint-Paul [2000] for a development of this approach. See also Bertola and Boeri [2003],
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in this context is the unemployment insurance system in place in France for peo-
ple involved in theater, movies, and the performing arts (in French, \intermittents
du spectacle"). Until this year, this unusually generous unemployment insurance
guaranteed up to 12 months of unemployment for anyone who had worked the
equivalent of 3 months in the previous year. Not surprisingly, this system ran a
large de¯cit. This could be seen as re°ecting the often stated commitment of the
French government to help and subsidize culture, except for the fact that the cost
is actually paid by ¯rms, through the ¯nancing of the de¯cit of this fund by the
general insurance fund, itself ¯nanced by payroll taxes. Perhaps because of numer-
ous abuses of the system, probably also because of the decrease in rents, in 2003,
¯rms proposed a reform of the system aimed not at eliminating it, but at mildly
tightening it (through an increase in the number of months needed to qualify, from
3 to 4 months, and a shorter base period over which to compute the number of
hours worked, 11 months rather than 12 months as before). The result was a long
strike in early summer 2003, leading to the cancellation of most festivals in France.
The reform has passed nevertheless, but the episode is a good example of both the
pressure on some institutions, and of likely tensions in the process of reform.
Think next in terms of social insurance. If one thinks of the system as involving
a trade{o® between social insurance and economic e±ciency, the questions are
whether European countries are on the e±cient frontier, and whether deregulation
is putting pressure to get closer to that frontier and reduce e±ciency losses.
A tentative answer is that many countries were indeed far from the frontier, and
that they are slowly moving closer to it, providing roughly the same level of social
insurance at a smaller e±ciency cost (i.e converging to a more e±cient European
model, rather than to the U.S. model). How much of the movement is due to
an increase in e±ciency costs coming from higher competition in goods or ¯nan-
cial markets, and how much is due to other factors (such as learning from other
countries' experiments, something which appears important in the case of unem-
ployment insurance, and in the case of negative income taxes) is di±cult to assess.Future of Europe 30
Let me consider di®erent institutions in turn.
² Since the mid 1980s, the most obvious °aws of the unemployment insur-
ance system have been corrected. In particular, the highest replacement
rates, which often made employment unattractive for low wage workers,
have been reduced (see for example Blanchard and Wolfers [2000]). In the
more recent past, unemployment insurance systems have increasingly moved
towards more active reemployment policies, in which unemployment ben-
e¯ts are sometimes more generous than before, but are terminated if the
unemployed refuse \reasonable job o®ers". This, for example, is what un-
derlied the Hartz commission proposals in Germany, now incorporated in
the \Agenda 2010" introduced by Chancellor SchrÄ oeder in 2003. De¯ning
\reasonable job o®ers," and providing unemployment agencies with the in-
centives to implement such policies has proven di±cult, but change is visi-
ble. There is also some evidence of convergence across countries. Italy, which
had a very low level of state-provided insurance, has increased the level over
time.
² Changes in employment protection have been more limited, and more am-
biguous in their e®ects.32 Reforms have often taken the form of one or two
steps forward, and one step back.
An interesting statistic can be constructed here based on the information
provided by the Fondazione Rodolfo deBenedetti, which monitors labor
market reforms in a number of European countries (FRDB [2003]).33 After
giving a short description of each reform, it categorizes them as minor or
major, increasing or decreasing employment °exibility. While the catego-
rization is often a bit arbitrary, the evidence, such as it is, is interesting:
Since 1993, Germany shows seven minor reforms increasing °exibility, ¯ve
minor reforms decreasing it, one major reform increasing °exibility, and
32. For an interesting theoretical analysis of the e®ects of trade liberalization on the political
economy of employment protection, see Bruegemann [2003].
33. Another useful source of information is the web site of EIRO, the European foundation for
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one major reform decreasing it. For the group of covered countries as a
whole, the number of reforms increasing °exibility barely exceeds the num-
ber of reforms decreasing °exibility. Here, again, there is some evidence of
convergence across countries. Italy, which had one of the highest levels of
employment protection to start, shows the highest number of °exibility{
increasing reforms (The general strike triggered, in 2002, by the attempt
by the Berlusconi government to introduce minor modi¯cations to \Article
18", the article regulating layo®s in Italy, and the subsequent failure of that
attempt, shows however that reform at this margin is not easy.)
These numbers however hide an important evolution, in which governments
have introduced reforms at the margin, extending the conditions under
which ¯rms can o®er temporary contracts to workers. The reason for doing
so was clear, the desire to increase the °exibility of ¯rms, while keeping the
existing level of protection for workers already protected. But this has led to
an increasingly dual labor market structure, with two categories of workers,
those covered by traditional employment protection, and those employed
under temporary contracts. The e®ects may well be perverse, increasing
the bargaining power of the protected workers. They may also make across-
the-board reform more, rather than less, di±cult in the future.34
² Finally, many countries have moved away from a focus on the minimum
wage to a focus on a negative income tax as the best instrument to achieve
higher income for low skill workers. The French \prime a l'emploi", the
Dutch \labour tax credit", the Belgian \work tax credit", all recently in-
troduced, resemble in many ways the earned income tax credit in the U.S.
Can European countries maintain the same level of social protection, but do it in
a way which allows them to return to low unemployment? Again, this is a question
which vastly exceeds the bounds of this article. But the evidence from a number
34. See for example the conclusions of the symposium in the Economic Journal, June 2002. See
also Saint Paul [1993] for a theoretical analysis of the political economy of two-tier systems.Future of Europe 32
of countries that have returned to low unemployment, from the Netherlands to
Sweden, suggest that the answer is positive.
4 Some Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued that Europe has done better than is often perceived;
that there has been and continues to be a steady process of reform in the product
and ¯nancial markets, that this process is likely to continue; that it has and will
continue to lead to reforms in the labor market, although not without tensions
along the way.
Is the outlook really so rosy? There are always reasons to worry. I shall mention
three, realizing that each one would deserve a much longer treatment. The ¯rst is
the current business cycle slump a®ecting Europe. As optimistic as I am about the
medium term, I see good reasons to worry about the short term, and about how
and when the European economy returns to the medium run path. The second is
the state of the public sector. As I have argued, pressure for reform is much weaker
there, and the public sector remains ine±cient. The third is the state of the higher
education system. The quality of higher education is mediocre in many European
countries. Even if it is di±cult to pinpoint the e®ect on growth, it is clearly likely
to be a handicap for Europe in the future.Future of Europe 33
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